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1 Introduction
Standard international macroeconomics predicts that capital flows from capital-rich coun-
tries, where the marginal return on investment is low, to capital-poor countries, where
the marginal return is high. Furthermore, there should be no difference between gross
and net capital flows, as capital movements are unidirectional.
The patterns of international capital flows observed in the past 20 years, however,
stand in stark contrast to these predictions Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001, 2006, 2007).
First, since 1998, the average per-capita income of countries running current account
surpluses has been below that of the deficit countries, i.e., net capital flows have been
“uphill” from poor to rich countries Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanian (2006, 2007). Sec-
ond, many developing economies, including China, Malaysia, and South Africa, are net
importers of foreign direct investment (hereafter, FDI) and net exporters of financial cap-
ital at the same time, while developed countries such as France, the United Kingdom,
and the United States exhibit the opposite pattern Ju and Wei (2007). Third, despite
its negative net international investment position since 1986, the U.S. has been receiving
a positive net investment income until 2005 Gourinchas and Rey (2007); Hausmann and
Sturzenegger (2007); Higgins, Klitgaard, and Tille (2007).
Recent research offers two main explanations to these empirical facts. Devereux and
Sutherland (2009) and Tille and van Wincoop (2010) focus on the cross-country risk-
sharing investors can achieve by diversifying their portfolios globally. International port-
folio investment is determined by the cross-correlation patterns of aggregate shocks at
the country level. These models do not distinguish between FDI and portfolio equity
investment and, therefore, offer no explanation for the second pattern.
The other strand of literature focuses on domestic financial market imperfections
Aoki, Benigno, and Kiyotaki (2009); Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008); Smith
and Valderrama (2008). Matsuyama (2004) shows that, in the presence of credit market
imperfections, financial market globalization may lead to a steady-state equilibrium in
which fundamentally identical countries end up with different levels of per capita output,
a result he calls “symmetry breaking”. Furthermore, financial capital flows from poor
to rich countries in the steady state. However, Matsuyama (2004) does not address FDI
flows. Mendoza, Quadrini, and R´ıos-Rull (2009) analyze the joint determination of finan-
cial capital flows and FDI in a heterogeneous-agent model with uninsurable idiosyncratic
endowment and investment risks. The precautionary savings motive plays the crucial role.
Ju and Wei (2007) show in a static model that, when both FDI and financial capital flows
are allowed, all financial capital leaves the country where credit market imperfections are
more severe, while FDI flows into this country. Thus, capital mobility allows investors to
fully bypass the underdeveloped financial system.
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Our paper extends the second strand of literature and provides a tractable, two-
country, overlapping-generations model to explain the three recent empirical facts. Our
model builds on the notion that individuals in an economy differ in the productivity Kiy-
otaki and Moore (1997). In the frictionless case, all capital would be operated by the most
productive individuals and, the rates of return on loan and equity capital would be equal
to the marginal return on investment. Due to financial frictions, however, individuals are
subject to borrowing constraints. The constraint on the aggregate credit demand has a
general equilibrium effect, keeping the rate of return on loans (hereafter, the loan rate)
lower and the rate of return on equity capital (hereafter, the equity rate) higher than the
marginal return on investment.1 Thus, financial frictions distort the two interest rates
and generate an equity premium in this deterministic model.
Following Matsuyama (2004), we take the tightness of the borrowing constraints as
a measure of a country’s level of financial development. In a more financially developed
country, credit contracts can be enforced and borrowers can be monitored more effectively.
Thus, the individuals can borrow more from financial institutions. The two countries
in our model differ fundamentally only in the level of financial development. Under
international financial autarky (hereafter, IFA), interest rates depend on two factors.
First, a lower aggregate capital-labor ratio implies a higher marginal return on investment
and a higher equity and loan rate. We call this the neoclassical effect, because it arises
from the concavity of the neoclassical production function with respect to the capital-
labor ratio. Second, for a given capital-labor ratio, a lower level of financial development
implies a lower aggregate credit demand, which leads to a lower loan rate and a higher
equity rate. We call this the credit-demand effect of financial development. Financial
frictions distort only the interest rates but not production efficiency under IFA in our
model.2 In the steady state, financial development affects the interest rates only via the
credit-demand channel but not the neoclassical channel. That is, the loan rate is higher
while the equity rate is lower in the more financially developed country.
Under full international capital mobility, the more financially developed country re-
ceives net capital inflows and becomes richer than the less financially developed country in
the steady state. Net capital flows are “uphill” from the poor to the rich country.3 In the
1The overlapping-generations framework together with certain assumptions ensures that the aggregate
credit supply is perfectly inelastic to the loan rate. Thus, we can isolate the effect of financial frictions on
the aggregate credit demand and on the interest rates. Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008) assume
that agents have a constant probability of death, which has the similar effect.
2This is due to the assumption that the less productive users of capital do not have an alternative
production technology except inelastically lending to the productive individuals. In von Hagen and Zhang
(2009), we relax this assumption and, as a result, financial frictions distort production efficiency as well
as interest rates. Our qualitative results still hold but the model then becomes less tractable.
3“Uphill” capital flows occur between two countries with the same level of financial development in
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steady state, financial capital flows from the poor to the rich country, while FDI flows in
the opposite direction. Since the rich country receives a higher return on its FDI than it
pays on its foreign debts, it gets a positive net investment income despite its negative net
position of international investment. Essentially, the more financially developed country
“exports” its financial services in the form of two-way capital flows and receives a positive
net reward. As our first contribution, we show that cross-country differences in financial
development can explain the three empirical facts.
Ju and Wei (2007) assume cross-country differences in factor endowments, financial
developments, corporate governance, and property rights protection to generate two-way
capital flows. In contrast, difference in financial development alone can do that in our
model. The static model of Ju and Wei (2007) is useful for analyzing the immediate im-
pacts of capital account liberalization, but not the transitional and long-run effects, while
our overlapping-generations model facilitates the short-run and the long-run analyses. In
the absence of uncertainty, international capital flows vanish in Devereux and Suther-
land (2009); Mendoza, Quadrini, and R´ıos-Rull (2009); Tille and van Wincoop (2010).
In contrast, international capital flows still exist in our deterministic model. This way,
we show that differences in financial development rather than uncertainty are the fun-
damental factor driving the recent patterns of international capital flows.4 In this sense,
our model shares the similar feature as Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008). How-
ever, Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008) assume that foreign direct investors from
the more financially developed country have the advantage in capitalizing the investment
revenue in the host country, while we do not need this extra assumption.
We also analyze a scenario where one country is more financially developed and in its
steady state, while the other country is less financially developed and below its steady
state before capital account liberalization. In so doing, we study the interactions of capital
flows and the economic convergence of the second country. We show that, if the initial
capital-labor ratio in the second country is very low, the neoclassical effect dominates the
credit-demand effect so that the loan rate is higher in the second country than in the
first country under IFA and so is the equity rate. Upon capital account liberalization,
both financial capital and FDI flow into the poor country. Thus, capital flows are one-
way and “downhill”. As the capital-labor ratio in the poor country grows over time,
the credit-demand effect begins to dominate the neoclassical effect and financial capital
flows “uphill”, but its size may still be dominated by that of “downhill” FDI. Thus, gross
capital flows are two-way and net capital flows are “downhill”. In both cases, capital
account liberalization facilitates net capital flows into the poor country, which enhances
Matsuyama (2004), while two countries differ in the level of financial development in our model.
4Aggregate or idiosyncratic uncertainty is important for the quantitative purpose in Devereux and
Sutherland (2009); Mendoza, Quadrini, and R´ıos-Rull (2009); Tille and van Wincoop (2010).
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capital accumulation and speeds up its convergence.
As the capital-labor ratio in the poor country grows further, “uphill” financial capital
flows begin to dominate “downhill” FDI. Thus, gross capital flows are two-way and net
capital flows are “uphill”. Since net capital outflows hamper capital accumulation, the
poor country eventually converges to a steady state with a lower capital-labor ratio than
under IFA. As our second contribution, we show that for a developing country which is
below its steady state, the patterns of capital flows may change and even reverse along
its convergence process. More importantly, capital account liberalization may offer this
country the short-run benefit of faster capital accumulation but at the long-run cost of
a lower output level. In order to reduce or avoid the long-run cost, this country should
liberalize capital account together with promoting financial development.
Financial capital flows affect the owners of credit capital and equity capital in the
opposite way and so do FDI flows. Due to transitional effects, capital flows also affect
the intergenerational income distribution. By pointing out its distributional effect, our
model offers an explanation for why capital account liberalization often encounters both
support and opposition in a given country.
We assume that the mass of individuals who can produce is fixed in each country, while
the size of each production project is endogenously determined. Thus, investment occurs
on the intensive margin instead of the extensive margin as in Matsuyama (2004). We
show that, under various forms of capital mobility, countries with identical fundamentals
have the same, unique, and stable steady state. As our third contribution, we show that
Matsuyama’s symmetry-breaking property depends critically on the assumption of a fixed
size of individual projects and thus, investment occurs on the extensive margin. In our
model, countries with identical fundamentals except the level of financial development
have the same steady-state output level under IFA, but they have different steady-state
levels of output under capital mobility. Thus, capital mobility also breaks the symmetry
in our model, but it does so for the reason different from that in Matsuyama (2004).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets up the model under
IFA. Section 3 proves the properties of the steady state and the patterns of international
capital flows under capital mobility. Section 4 concludes with the main findings. Appendix
collects the technical proofs and relevant discussions.
2 The Model under International Financial Autarky
We use an overlapping-generations model closely related to Matsuyama (2004). The
world economy consists of two countries, Home (H) and Foreign (F). There are two types
of goods, a final good, which is internationally tradable and serves as the numeraire,
and a capital good, which is not traded internationally. The price of the capital good in
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country i ∈ {H,F} and period t is denoted by vit. The final good can be either consumed
or transformed into capital goods. At the beginning of each period, final goods Y it are
produced with capital goods Kit and labor L
i
t in a Cobb-Douglas fashion. Capital goods
fully depreciate after production. Capital goods and labor are priced at their respective
marginal products in terms of final goods. To summarize,
Y it =
(
Kit
α
)α(
Lit
1− α
)1−α
, where α ∈ (0, 1), (1)
vitK
i
t = αY
i
t and w
i
tL
i
t = (1− α)Y it . (2)
There is no uncertainty in the economy. In this section, we assume that capital flows are
not allowed between the two countries.
In both countries, the population consists of two generations, the old and the young,
which live for two periods each. There is no population growth and the population size
of each generation in each country is normalized to one. Agents consume only when old.
Young agents are endowed with a unit of labor which they supply inelastically to the
production of final goods Lit = 1 at the wage rate w
i
t in period t. Each generation consists
of two types of agents of mass η and 1− η, respectively, which we call entrepreneurs and
workers. Only young entrepreneurs are endowed with the productive projects and it takes
one period to produce capital goods using final goods.
Consider any particular worker born in period t. With no other investment opportunity
available to him5, the worker lends his entire labor income inelastically to the credit market
at a gross interest rate of rit in period t to finance his consumption in period t+ 1,
ci,wt+1 = w
i
tr
i
t. (3)
Consider any particular entrepreneur born in period t. The entrepreneur invests iit
units of final goods into his project in period t and produces Riit units of capital goods in
period t+ 1. Given the gross loan rate of rit, he finances the investment i
i
t with the debt
zit = i
i
t − wit and the equity capital, wit. Due to limited commitment problems, however,
he can borrow only against a fraction of the project revenues,
ritz
i
t = r
i
t(i
i
t − wit) ≤ θiRiitvit+1. (4)
As in Matsuyama (2004, 2007, 2008), the level of financial development in country i is
measured by θi ∈ (0, 1]. θi is higher in countries with more sophisticated financial and
legal systems, better creditor protection, and more liquid asset market. Thus, θi captures
5Excluding workers from other savings alternatives facilitates the closed-form solution, but it may
seem implausible. von Hagen and Zhang (2009) show that allowing workers to have other investment
opportunity does not change our results qualitatively but the model becomes less tractable.
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a wide range of institutional factors.6 We assume that the two countries differ only in the
level of financial development, i.e., 0 < θH < θF ≤ 1.
Let λit ≡ i
i
t
wit
denote the investment-equity ratio of the entrepreneurial project and I it
denotes the aggregate project investment in country i and period t. Under IFA, the credit
market equilibrium condition,
η(iit − wit) = (1− η)wit, ⇒ I it = ηiit = wit, (5)
implies that aggregate labor income in period t is invested by young entrepreneurs. Thus,
the investment-equity ratio is constant at λit =
1
η
and the level of financial development
θi does not affect aggregate investment. Intuitively, the aggregate credit demand is lower
in the country with a lower level of financial development. Given the perfectly inelastic
aggregate credit supply, the credit market clears at a lower loan rate.
After repaying his debt in period t + 1, the entrepreneur gets Riitv
i
t+1 − ritzit as net
return. The equity rate is defined as the rate of return on the equity capital (wit),
Γit ≡
Riitv
i
t+1 − ritzit
wit
= Rvit+1 + (Rv
i
t+1 − rit)
(1− η)
η
≥ rit. (6)
Intuitively, for each unit of equity capital invested in the project, the entrepreneur gets
Rvit+1 as the marginal return. Additionally, he can borrow (λ
i
t − 1) = (1−η)η units of
debt which gives him an extra rate of return, Rvit+1 − rit. The term (Rvit+1 − rit) (1−η)η
captures the leverage effect. In equilibrium, the equity rate should be no less than the
loan rate; otherwise, he would rather lend than borrow. The inequality in (6) is equivalent
to rit ≤ Rvit+1 and can be considered as his participation constraint.
If rit < Rv
i
t+1, the entrepreneur borrows to the limit, i.e., he finances the investment
iit using z
i
t =
θiRiitv
i
t+1
rit
units of debt and wit units of equity capital in period t. After
repaying the debt in period t+ 1, he gets (1− θi)Riitvt+1 as the project return. Given the
investment-equity ratio at λit ≡ i
i
t
wit
= 1
η
, the equity rate has a closed-form solution,
Γit =
(1− θi)Riitvit+1
wit
=
(1− θi)Rvit+1
η
. (7)
Combining Eq. (6) and (7), we get a closed-form solution for the loan rate,
rit =
θiRvit+1
1− η . (8)
6The pledgeability, θ, can be argued in various forms of agency costs, e.g., costly state verification by
Townsend (1979), inalienable human capital by Hart and Moore (1994), or unobservable project (effort)
choices by Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). In order to compare our results with Matsuyama (2004),
we minimize the deviation of our model setting from his by choosing this simplest form of borrowing
constraints. The pledgeability of individual projects may depend on idiosyncratic features. As we focus
on the aggregate implications of financial development, we assume that entrepreneurs investing in country
i are subject to the same θi for simplicity.
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If rit = Rv
i
t+1, the entrepreneur does not borrow to the limit. According to Eq. (6), the
equity rate is equal to the loan rate, Γit = r
i
t = Rv
i
t+1. Lemma 1 summarizes the interest
rate patterns with respect to the level of financial development.
Lemma 1. Let θ¯ ≡ 1 − η. For θi ∈ (θ¯, 1], the borrowing constraints are not binding
and Γit = r
i
t = Rv
i
t+1; for θ
i ∈ (0, θ¯), the borrowing constraints are binding and Γit =
(1−θi)Rvit+1
η
> Rvit+1 >
θiRvit+1
1−η = r
i
t.
Given the labor income wit, the entrepreneur chooses the project investment i
i
t in period
t to maximize his consumption in period t+ 1,
ci,et+1 = v
i
t+1Ri
i
t − ritzit = witΓit, (9)
subject to the borrowing constraint (4) and the participation constraint (6). Note that
only one of the two constraints can be strictly binding in equilibrium.
Since aggregate labor income is invested in the entrepreneurial projects in period t,
aggregate output of capital goods available for production in period t+ 1 is
Kt+1 = RI
i
t = Rw
i
t. (10)
The market-clearing condition for final goods in period t is
Cit + I
i
t = Y
i
t , (11)
where Cit = ηc
i,e
t +(1−η)ci,wt is the aggregate consumption of the old generation in period
t. We measure the social welfare of the generation born in period t and country i using
its aggregate consumption when old, Cit+1.
Definition 1. Given the level of financial development θi, a market equilibrium in country
i ∈ {H,F} under IFA is a set of allocations of workers, {ci,wt }, entrepreneurs, {iit, zit, ci,et },
and aggregate variables, {Y it , Kit , I it , Cit , wit, vit, rit,Γit}, satisfying Eq. (1)-(5) and (9)-(11)
as well as Lemma 1.
Since the size of the working population is normalized at one, the capital-labor ratio
coincides with the aggregate capital stock. Thus, Kit also denotes the capital-labor ratio.
According to Eq. (1), (2), and (10), the model dynamics can be characterized by a
nonlinear first-order difference equation on wages,
wit+1 = (1− α)Y it+1 =
(
Kit+1
ρ
)α
=
(
Rwit
ρ
)α
, where ρ ≡ α
1− α. (12)
Given α ∈ (0, 1), the phase diagram of wages is concave and starts from the origin. Its
slope,
dwit+1
dwit
= α
(
R
ρ
)α
(wit)
α−1, converges to +∞ for wit → 0 and to 0 for wit → +∞.
Thus, there exists a unique and stable non-zero steady state with the wage at,
wIFA =
(
R
ρ
)ρ
, (13)
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where a variable with subscript IFA denotes its steady-state value under IFA. According
to Eq. (12) and (13), the wage dynamics are independent of the level of financial devel-
opment θi and, thus, the wage converges to the same steady state in the two countries.
So do aggregate output and capital.
According to Lemma 1, for θi ∈ [1 − η, 1], the two interest rates are equal to the
marginal return on investment, rit = Γ
i
t = Rv
i
t+1 = R
αρ1−α
2
(Kit)
α(α−1), depending nega-
tively on the capital-labor ratio, Kit . Thus, the two interest rates are higher in the country
with a lower capital-labor ratio. We call this the neoclassical effect, because it arises from
the concavity of the neoclassical production function with respect to the capital-labor
ratio. The neoclassical effect is independent of the level of financial development.
For θi ∈ (0, 1 − η), besides the neoclassical effect, the loan rate is affected positively
by the level of financial development, rit = Rv
i
t+1
θi
(1−η) . Given the capital-labor ratio, the
loan rate is higher in the country with a higher θ, reflecting the general equilibrium effect
of the larger aggregate credit demand. We call this the credit-demand effect of financial
development, captured by θ
i
(1−η) ∈ (0, 1). According to Eq. (6), besides the neoclassical
effect, the equity rate is also affected by the leverage effect. Given the capital-labor
ratio, the spread (Rvit+1 − rit) is lower in the country with a higher θ so that, with the
debt-equity ratio constant at (1−η)
η
, the leverage effect is smaller. The equity rate is thus
affected negatively by the level of financial development, Γit = Rv
i
t+1
(1−θi)
η
.
Under IFA, the financial frictions in our model do not distort production efficiency, but
they distort the two interest rates 7 In so doing, financial frictions have a distributional
effect on the welfare of borrowers (entrepreneurs) and lenders (workers).
Aggregate labor income is invested in the entrepreneurial projects in period t, I it =
wit = (1−α)Y it , and aggregate output of capital goods has the value of vit+1Kit+1 = αY it+1 in
period t+ 1. In the steady state, Y it+1 = Y
i
t = Y
i, and the marginal return on investment
is viR = v
iKi
wi
= αY
i
(1−α)Y i = ρ. Plugging it into Lemma 1, we get the steady-state pattern
of interest rates, which is summarized in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. For θi ∈ (θ¯, 1], the two interest rates are independent of the level of
financial development, ri = Γi = ρ; for θi ∈ (0, θ¯), the loan rate rises and the equity rate
declines in the level of financial development, ri = θ
iρ
1−η < ρ < Γ
i = (1−θ
i)ρ
η
.
Figure 1 shows the steady-state pattern of output, wages, and interest rates, with the
horizontal axis denoting θ ∈ (0, 1], where θU ≡ θ¯ = 1− η. Since financial frictions in our
7The equity premium, Γt − rt > 0, in the case of θi ∈ (0, θ¯) arises from two factors, i.e., the difference
in productivity and the binding borrowing constraints. For θ ∈ (0, θ¯), the constraint on aggregate credit
demand keeps the loan rate lower than the marginal return on investment. The equity premium is the
reward to entrepreneurs’ advantage in productivity. For θ ∈ (θ¯, 1], the unconstrained aggregate credit
demand raises the loan rate to the marginal return on investment and the equity premium vanishes.
9
Y
IFA
w
IFA
θ0 1
Γ
IFA
r
IFA
ρ
θ
θU
0 1
Figure 1: Steady-State Pattern under IFA
model does not affect production efficiency, aggregate output is independent of θi and the
marginal return on investment is constant at ρ. Thus, the cross-country loan rate (equity
rate) differentials only depend on the credit-demand (leverage) effect.
According to Proposition 1, for θH ∈ [0, θ¯) and θF ∈ (θH , 1], the loan rate is lower
while the equity rate higher in country H than in county F; for θ¯ ≤ θH < θF ≤ 1, the
borrowing constraints are not binding in the two countries so that the credit-demand
effect and the leverage effect are muted. Then, the two interest rates coincide with the
marginal return on investment, which is same in the two countries.
3 International Capital Mobility
We consider three scenarios of capital mobility, free mobility of financial capital under
which individuals are allowed to lend abroad but entrepreneurs are not allowed to make
direct investments abroad, free mobility of FDI under which entrepreneurs are allowed to
make direct investments abroad but individuals are not allowed to lend abroad, and full
capital mobility under which individuals are allowed to lend abroad and entrepreneurs are
allowed to make direct investments abroad.
Without loss of generality, we study the case of 0 < θH < θF ≤ θ¯, where the borrowing
constraints are binding in the two countries in the steady state under three scenarios of
capital mobility. B provides a general analysis for θi ∈ (0, 1), where i ∈ {H,F}.
In subsections 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3, we assume that the two countries are in the steady
state under IFA before capital mobility is allowed from period t = 0 on. We analyze
capital flows in the short run and in the long run between two countries with the same
initial output level. The results on the uniqueness and stability of the market equilibrium
before and after capital mobility do not depend on this assumption.
In subsection 3.4, we assume that country F is in the steady state and country H is
below the steady state under IFA before capital mobility is allowed from period t = 0 on.
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We study the interactions between capital flows and economic convergence of country H.
Let Υit and Ω
i
t denote the aggregate outflows of financial capital and FDI from country
i in period t, respectively, with negative values indicating capital inflows. Financial capital
outflows reduce the domestic credit supply, (1− η)wit−Υit, while FDI outflows reduce the
aggregate equity capital available for the domestic investment, ηwit −Ωit. Therefore, FDI
flows raise the aggregate credit demand in the host country and reduce that in the parent
country.8 With these changes, the analysis in section 2 carries through for the cases of
capital mobility, due to the linearity of preferences, projects, and borrowing constraints.
3.1 Free Mobility of Financial Capital
The Cobb-Douglas production function implies that
vit+1 = (w
i
t+1)
− 1
ρ and I it =
Kit+1
R
=
ρ
R
(wit+1)
1
α . (14)
Free mobility of financial capital equalizes the loan rates across the border, rHt = r
F
t = r
∗
t .
Given the domestic equity capital ηwit, the aggregate domestic investment is,
I it = λ
i
tηw
i
t =
ηwit
1− θiRvit+1
r∗t
. (15)
Using Eq. (14) and (15) to substitute away I it and v
i
t+1, we get
ηwit =
ρ
R
(wit+1)
1
α − θ
iρ
r∗t
wit+1. (16)
3.1.1 Existence, Uniqueness, and Stability of the Steady State
Let a variable with subscript FCF denote its steady-state value under free flows of finan-
cial capital.
Proposition 2. Given the world loan rate r∗FCF , there exists a unique and stable non-zero
steady state with the wage rate at wiFCF = wIFA
[
η + (1− η) riIFA
r∗FCF
]ρ
.
The solid line and the dash-dotted line in the left panel of figure 2 show the phase
diagrams of wages under IFA and under free mobility of financial capital, respectively,
given a fixed world loan rate at r∗t = r
i
IFA. In both cases, wages converge monotonically
and globally to a unique and stable steady state (point A).
8In the case of debt default, the project liquidation value depends on the efficiency of the legal
institution, the law enforcement, and the asset market in the host country. Thus, we assume that
entrepreneurs making FDI borrow only from the host country and are subject to the borrowing constraints
there. Alternatively, we can assume that entrepreneurs may borrow only in their parent country no matter
where they invest, since the financial institutions in their parent country have better information on the
credit record, social network, and business activities of the entrepreneurs. The realistic case should be a
hybrid of these two. Our results hold under the two alternative assumptions.
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Figure 2: The Phase Diagrams of Wage
Matsuyama (2004) assumes that the size of every production project is fixed at iit = 1,
while the mass of individuals in a country who become entrepreneurs is endogenously
determined. He shows that, at a given world loan rate, free mobility of financial capital
may lead to an equilibrium with multiple steady states. In contrast, we assume that the
mass of entrepreneurs in a country is fixed at η, while the investment size of any project
iit is endogenously determined. Since his model and ours differ only in this one aspect, it
is straightforward to illustrate Matsuyama’s result in the current framework.
The borrowing constraints, if binding, take the same form in both models,
r∗t (1−
wit
iit
) = θiRvit+1 = θ
iR(wit+1)
− 1
ρ . (17)
Lemma 2. Given the world loan rate r∗t , for w
i
t ∈ [0, 1− θi], the phase diagram of wages
in Matsuyama (2004) described by r∗t (1− wit) = θiR(wit+1)−
1
ρ is strictly convex, and wit+1
monotonically increases in wit with an intercept on the vertical axis at w
i
t+1 =
[
θiR
r∗t
]ρ
; for
wit > 1− θi, the phase diagram of wages is flat with wit+1 =
(
R
r∗t
)ρ
.
The solid line in the right panel of figure 2 shows the phase diagram of wages under
IFA in Matsuyama (2004), which is the same as in our model and gives rise to the unique
and stable steady state at point A. The dash-dotted line shows the phase diagram under
free mobility of financial capital in his model, given a fixed world loan rate r∗t = r
i
IFA.
The phase diagram is convex for wages below a threshold value. Thus, the steady state at
point A becomes unstable under free mobility of financial capital, because the slope of the
phase diagram at point A is larger than one. There are two stable steady states at points
B and G. This implies that countries with the identical fundamentals (including θ) and,
thus, the same steady state under IFA may end up with different levels of income under
free mobility of financial capital. Thus, Matsuyama (2004) claims that, in the presence of
credit market imperfections, financial capital flows may result in the symmetry breaking.9
9The symmetry-breaking property depends on the specific value of the world loan rate and the steady-
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According to Eq. (17), given a world loan rate and a fixed size of project investment as
in Matsuyama (2004), a marginal increase in the current wage reduces the credit demand
of each borrower, (1−wit), and the debt-investment ratio, z
i
t
iit
= (1− wit
iit
) = (1−wit). More
domestic individuals can borrow at the prevailing world loan rate and produce. If the
current wage wit exceeds the level corresponding to point A, the debt-investment ratio
will decrease and more individuals will become entrepreneurs. The higher the current
wage wit, the larger the expansion of aggregate investment and, consequently, the larger
the increase in aggregate output and the wage in the next period. This explains the
convexity of the phase diagram of wages in Matsuyama’s model.
In contrast, given a constant world loan rate and a fixed mass of entrepreneurs in our
model, a marginal increase in the current wage enables entrepreneurs to borrow and invest
more. According to Eq. (17), the increase in the current investment iit partially offsets
the negative effect of a marginal increase in the current wage wit on the debt-investment
ratio,
zit
iit
= (1− wit
iit
), and then on the wage in the next period, wit+1. The higher the current
wage, the smaller the investment expansion and, consequently, the smaller the increase
in aggregate output and the wage in the next period. This explains the concavity of the
phase diagram of wages and the uniqueness of the steady state in our model.
3.1.2 Interest Rates and Capital Flows
Proposition 3. There exists a unique world loan rate r∗t that clears the world credit
market every period. In the steady state, r∗FCF ∈ (r∗, rFIFA), where r∗ ≡ r
H
IFA+r
F
IFA
2
.
Intuitively, given the steady-state loan rates in the two countries under IFA, rHIFA <
rFIFA, the steady-state loan rate under free mobility of financial capital lies between them.
Proposition 4. Under free mobility of financial capital, if the borrowing constraints are
binding in country i, Γit =
(1−θi)ρ
η
wit+1
wit
. In the steady state, ΓiFCF =
(1−θi)ρ
η
= ΓiIFA.
Given the binding borrowing constraints, entrepreneurs use
zit
iit
=
θiRvit+1
r∗t
units of loans
and
wit
iit
=
(1−θi)Rvit+1
Γit
units of equity capital to finance a unit of investment in period t.
1 =
zit
iit
+
wit
iit
=
θiRvit+1
r∗t
+
(1− θi)Rvit+1
Γit
⇒ 1− θ
i
Γit
=
1
Rvit+1
− θ
i
r∗t
. (18)
Given θi, financial capital flows affect the equity rate in two ways. Consider country H.
First, financial capital outflows raise the loan rate and the decline in the spread tends
to reduce the equity rate. Second, financial capital outflows have a general equilibrium
effect, i.e., the decline in the current aggregate investment reduces aggregate output in
period t+ 1 and the price of capital goods rises, which tends to raise the equity rate.
state equilibrium may be unique under other values of world loan rate. See Matsuyama (2004) for details.
13
Financial capital outflows in period t = 0 reduce the labor income in period t = 1,
wi1 < w
i
0 = wIFA, and the equity rate is lower in period t = 0, Γ
i
0 =
(1−θi)ρ
η
wi1
wi0
< (1−θ
i)ρ
η
=
ΓiIFA, according to Proposition 4. Thus, in period t = 0, the first effect dominates the
second and the equity rate is lower than the steady-state level under IFA. As the economy
converges to the new steady state, the price of capital goods rises further and the equity
rate converges back to the initial level, because the initial effect on the spread is fully
offset by the neoclassical effect over time.
Proposition 5. In the steady state, financial capital flows from country H to country F,
ΥHFCF > 0 > Υ
F
FCF , where Υ
i
FCF = (r
∗
FCF − riIFA) (1−η)w
i
FCF
r∗FCF
and i ∈ {H,F}.
In the steady state, financial capital outflows from country i are proportional to the
steady-state loan-rate differentials under free mobility of financial capital and under IFA.
Since rHIFA < r
∗
FCF < r
F
IFA, country H (F) witnesses financial capital outflows (inflows).
3.1.3 Production and Welfare
From period t = 0 on, financial capital flows reduce (raise) aggregate investment in
country H (F). Thus, from period t = 1 on, aggregate output in country H (F) is lower
(higher) than before period t = 0, Y Ht < YIFA < Y
H
t .
Proposition 6. From period t = 1 on, Y Ht + Y
F
t < 2YIFA.
Before period t = 0, aggregate production in the two countries is efficient and identical.
From period t = 0 on, the cross-country resource reallocation due to financial capital flows
lead the world economy away from the efficient allocation. Due to the concave aggregate
production with respect to the capital-labor ratio at the country level, the world output is
lower than before period t = 0, according to the Jensen’s inequality. This also explains the
world output losses in Matsuyama (2004). More generally, this is a typical result of the
theory of second best. Given domestic financial frictions, capital account liberalization
causes financial capital to flow to the country with the higher loan rate rather than to
the country with the higher marginal product of capital.
Since financial frictions do not affect production efficiency, aggregate output in the
steady state is same in the two countries under IFA, even if the two countries have
the different levels of financial development. International capital flows break the initial
symmetry in the two countries in our model similar as in Matsuyama (2004) but for
different reasons. In particular, the levels of financial development in the two countries
are same in Matsuyama (2004) but they are different in our model.
The welfare of individuals born in period t and country i is measured by their con-
sumption in period t+1. According to Proposition 4, the welfare of entrepreneurs is given
as ci,et+1 = w
i
tΓ
i
t = w
i
t+1
(1−θi)ρ
η
, reflecting the joint effects of financial capital flows on labor
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income and on the equity rate. From period t = 0 on, due to financial capital flows, the
labor income falls in country H and rises in country F in period t+1, wHt+1 < wIFA < w
F
t+1.
Thus, entrepreneurs born in country H (F) are strictly worse (better) off than before pe-
riod t = 0, implying that entrepreneurs in the less (more) financially developed country
have a strong incentive to oppose (support) policies favoring financial capital mobility.
The welfare of workers born in period t and country i is given by ci,wt+1 = w
i
tr
i
t. Given
the predetermined labor income wi0, workers born in country H (F) and period t = 0 are
better (worse) off, ci,w1 = w
i
0r
∗
0, due to the rise (decline) in the loan rate, r
H
IFA < r
∗
0 < r
F
IFA.
From period t = 1 on, financial capital flows affect workers born in country H (F) and
period t, ci,wt+1 = w
H
t r
∗
t , negatively (positively) through labor income, w
H
t < wIFA < w
F
t
and positively (negatively) through the loan rate, rHIFA < r
∗
t < r
F
IFA.
Proposition 7. In comparison with the steady state under IFA, free mobility of financial
capital makes entrepreneurs in country H (F) worse (better) off, while the welfare effects
on workers and at the country level depend on the parameters, especially the levels of
financial development in the two countries.
Table 1 summarizes the long-run welfare impacts on workers under various parameter
constellations10, where κ ≡ (ρ−1)(1−η)
η
.
Table 1: The Long-Run Welfare Impacts on Workers
κ ∈ (−∞, θH+θF
2θF
] κ ∈ ( θH+θF
2θF
, 1] κ ∈ (1, θF
θH
] κ ∈ ( θF
θH
,∞)
cH,wFCF − cH,wIFA + + ? -
cF,wFCF − cF,wIFA - ? + +
If κ ∈ (−∞, θH+θF
2θF
], entrepreneurs (workers) in country H lose (benefit) from financial
capital flows in the long run as well as in the short run. Similar results exist for country
F. Thus, free mobility of financial capital may affect different individuals in the same
country in the opposite ways.
Since free mobility of financial capital reduces the world output in the steady state,
its welfare effect at the world level is negative and no public transfer policy can achieve a
world-level Pareto improvement in comparison with the case of IFA.
10The conventional values of parameters should be used with cautions in the OLG model. As we focus
here on the qualitative results, we do not take specific positions on the parameter values but offer the
full range of possibilities. Readers who are interested in this issue may decide on which interval κ may
belong to. For example, if the capital share is set at α = 13 , we get κ < 0. Thus, workers in country
F are worse off in the long run. Boyd and Smith (1997) set α = 0.65 in some example. If so, together
with a reasonable population share of entrepreneurs η = 20%, we may get κ > 1. In this case, workers in
country F are better off in the long run.
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Proposition 8. Workers of different generations born in the same country may be affected
by financial capital flows in opposite ways during the transitional process from IFA to free
mobility of financial capital.
Financial capital outflows make workers born in country H and period t = 0 better
off. According to Table 1, if κ ≥ θF
θH
, the decline in labor income dominates the rise in the
loan rate in the long run so that workers are worse off in the long run. Workers of early
and later generations born in country F are also affected in the opposite way. Thus, free
mobility of financial capital may have opposite welfare effects across generations.
3.2 Free Mobility of FDI
The analysis for free mobility of FDI yields a mirror image of that for free mobility of
financial capital. We summarize the results here and A contains the full analysis.
Under free mobility of FDI, there exists a unique and stable steady state with the
wage at wiFDI = wIFA
[
1− η + η ΓiIFA
Γ∗FDI
]ρ
, where a variable with subscript FDI denotes
its steady-state value under free flows of FDI. In the steady state, the world equity rate
is Γ∗FDI ∈ (Γ∗,ΓHIFA), where Γ∗ ≡ Γ
H
IFA+Γ
F
IFA
2
; FDI flows from country F to country H,
ΩHFDI < 0 < Ω
F
FDI , where Ω
i
FDI = (Γ
∗
FDI − ΓiIFA) ηw
i
FDI
Γ∗FDI
and i ∈ {H,F}. The loan rate
has a closed-form solution, rit =
θiρ
(1−η)
wit+1
wit
, with the steady-state value riFDI =
θiρ
1−η = r
i
IFA.
Initially, aggregate production in the two countries is efficient and identical. From
period t = 0 on, FDI flows raise (reduce) aggregate investment in country H (F) and
aggregate output in country H (F) is higher (lower). According to the Jensen’s inequality,
the cross-country output gap implies a lower world output under free mobility of FDI.
From period t = 0 on, FDI flows make the labor income in country H (F) higher (lower)
than its initial value in period t + 1, wHt+1 > wIFA > w
F
t+1. Workers born in country H
(F) are better (worse) off than those born before period t = 0, ci,wt+1 = w
i
tr
i
t = w
i
t+1
θiρ
(1−η) .
Thus, workers in the less (more) financially developed country have a strong incentive to
support (oppose) policies favoring international mobility of FDI.
Given the predetermined labor income wi0, entrepreneurs born in country H (F) and
period t = 0 are worse (better) off, ci,e1 = w
i
0Γ
∗
0, due to the decline (rise) in the equity rate,
ΓHIFA > Γ
∗
0 > Γ
F
IFA. From period t = 1 on, FDI flows affect entrepreneurs born in country
H (F), ci,et+1 = w
i
tΓ
∗
t , positively (negatively) through labor income, w
H
t > wIFA > w
F
t and
negatively (positively) through the equity rate, ΓHIFA > Γ
∗
t > Γ
F
IFA. Table 2 summarizes
the long-run welfare impacts on entrepreneurs, where µ ≡ (ρ−1)η
(1−η) .
In comparison with the steady state under IFA, the country-level welfare effect is am-
biguous. Since it reduces the world output in the steady state, its world-level welfare effect
is negative and no public transfer policy can achieve a world-level Pareto improvement.
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Table 2: The Long-Run Welfare Impacts on Entrepreneurs
µ ∈ (−∞, 1−θH+1−θF
2(1−θH) ] µ ∈ (1−θ
H+1−θF
2(1−θH) , 1] µ ∈ (1, 1−θ
H
1−θF ] µ ∈ (1−θ
H
1−θF ,∞)
cH,eFDI − cH,eIFA - ? + +
cF,eFDI − cF,eIFA + + ? -
3.3 Full Capital Mobility
Full capital mobility equalizes the loan rates and the equity rates across the border,
rHt = r
F
t = r
∗
t and Γ
H
t = Γ
F
t = Γ
∗
t . Using Eq. (14) to substitute away v
i
t+1 from Eq. (18),
we get
(wit+1)
1
ρ =
R
ρ
[
(1− θi)ρ
Γ∗t
+
θiρ
r∗t
]
, with
∂wit+1
∂Γ∗t
< 0,
∂wit+1
∂r∗t
< 0. (19)
3.3.1 Existence, Uniqueness, and Stability of the Steady State
Let a variable with subscript FCM denote its steady-state value under full capital mo-
bility.
Proposition 9. Given the world interest rates r∗FCM and Γ
∗
FCM , there is a unique and
stable non-zero steady state with the wage at wiFCM = wIFA
[
(1−θi)ρ
Γ∗FCM
+ θ
iρ
r∗FCM
]ρ
.
3.3.2 Interest Rates and Capital Flows
Before period t = 0, the loan rate (the equity rate) is lower (higher) in country H than in
country F. From period t = 0 on, the initial interest rate differentials drive the flows of
financial capital and FDI.
Proposition 10. There exists a unique world loan rate and a unique world equity rate that
clear the world credit market and the world equity market, respectively, in every period.
In the steady state, Γ∗FCM ∈ (ΓFIFA,Γ∗) and r∗FCM ∈ (r∗, rFIFA).
The steady-state loan rate and equity rate under full capital mobility should lie be-
tween their respective values under IFA.
Proposition 11. In the steady state, financial capital flows from country H to country
F, ΥHFCM > 0 > Υ
F
FCM , FDI flows in the opposite direction, Ω
H
FCM < 0 < Ω
F
FCM , and net
capital flows are from country H to country F, ΥHFCM + Ω
H
FCM > 0 > Υ
F
FCM + Ω
F
FCM , with
ΥiFCM = (r
∗
FCM − riIFA) (1−η)w
i
FCM
r∗FCM
, ΩiFCM = (Γ
∗
FCM − ΓiIFA) ηw
i
FCM
Γ∗FCM
, and i ∈ {H,F}.
In the steady state, financial capital (FDI) outflows from country i have the same
functional form as under free mobility of financial capital (FDI). Since the credit market
in country F has a larger capacity, net capital flows are from country H to country F.
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3.3.3 Production and Welfare
Proposition 12. In the steady state, net capital flows keep aggregate output in country
H (F) lower (higher) than its steady-state value under IFA, Y HFCM < YIFA < Y
F
FCM . The
world output is lower than under IFA, Y HFCM + Y
F
FCM < 2YIFA.
The world output losses depend on net capital flows rather than gross capital flows.
Proposition 13. In the steady state, country F has a negative net international invest-
ment position, ΥFFCM + Ω
F
FCM < 0, but it receives a positive net investment income,
(r∗FCM − 1)ΥFFCM + (Γ∗FCM − 1)ΩFFCM > 0.
Given the positive equity premium, Γ∗t > r
∗
t , country F earns a higher return on its di-
rect investments abroad than its pays out on foreign debts. Although closed-form solutions
of the interest rates do not exist, we can still prove that r∗FCMΥ
i
FCM + Γ
∗
FCMΩ
i
FCM = 0.
Thus, the net investment income of country F,
(r∗FCM − 1)ΥFFCM + (Γ∗FCM − 1)ΩFFCM = −(ΥFFCM + ΩFFCM) = ΥHFCM + ΩHFCM ,
is fully financed by net capital outflows from country H. Intuitively, country F has a
competitive advantage in financial intermediation. By exporting financial services via
two-way capital flows, it receives a positive net investment income.
Proposition 14. In the steady state, due to the decline (rise) in labor income and the
equity rate in country H (F), entrepreneurs in country H (F) are worse (better) off than
in the steady state under IFA. In addition, country H (F) as a whole is worse (better) off.
Full capital mobility is never an option for country H to make a Pareto improvement
upon the steady-state allocation under IFA. In contrast, full capital mobility is a good
option for country F to make a Pareto improvement, if implemented with some properly
designed public transfer policies. Net capital flows widen the cross-country output gap,
which generates the world output losses. In this case, full capital mobility can never
achieve a Pareto improvement at the world level.
3.4 Capital Mobility and Economic Convergence
We analyze here how full capital mobility affects the economic convergence of country H,
if it is initially below its steady state before period t = 0. The properties of the market
equilibrium under full capital mobility proved in subsection 3.3 do not depend on whether
any country is initially in the steady state. Thus, the convergence path of country H is
always stable and unique under full capital mobility as well as under IFA.
Figure 3 plots the capital-labor ratio in country H against the degree of financial
development and provides an overview of the directions of gross and net capital flows
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during the convergence process to the steady state. The upper bound of figure 3 and the
solid line represent the steady-state values of the capital-labor ratio under IFA and under
full capital mobility, KIFA and K
H
FCM , respectively.
D−O
D−T
U−T
 KHFCM
 θH  θF
 KIFA
 KHt
0
A
Figure 3: Full Capital Mobility between Initially Poor and Rich Countries
Suppose that the level of financial development in country H is constant over time
0 < θH < θF and that country H’s initial capital-labor ratio is at point A. Lemma 1
implies that, under IFA, the equity rate is strictly higher in country H than in country
F. With full capital mobility, FDI flows unambiguously “downhill” from country F to
country H and the equity rates equalize. The direction of financial capital flows, however,
depends on the initial capital-labor ratio, KH0 .
Given KH0 at the initial level at point A, the neoclassical effect dominates the credit
demand effect. Under IFA, the loan rate is higher in country H than in country F. With
full capital mobility, both financial capital and FDI flow “Downhill” and One-way.
Over time, the capital-labor ratio in country H rises along the arrow and eventually
crosses a threshold value given by the dash-dotted line. The neoclassical effect is then
dominated by the credit demand effect. Under IFA, the loan rate would be lower in
country H than in country F. With full capital mobility, financial capital flows “uphill”
and FDI flows “downhill”. However, net capital flows are still “Downhill”, while gross
capital flows are Two-way.
As the capital-labor ratio in country H grows further, it crosses a second threshold
value given by the dotted line. Financial capital still flows “uphill” and FDI flows “down-
hill”. However, net capital flows become “Uphill” while gross capital flows are Two-way.
Eventually, the capital-labor ratio reaches its steady state given by the solid line with
two-way gross capital flows and “uphill” net capital flows. In this sense, the phenomenon
of two-way capital flows is a feature of middle-income rather than low-income economies.
Now we may address the costs and benefits of capital account liberalization for a
19
developing country converging to its steady state. Suppose that its initial capital-labor
ratio is at point A. Without international capital flows, it would gradually converge to
the level KIFA. With international capital flows, both financial capital and FDI flow
into this country, which speeds up its capital accumulation in the short run. As the
capital-labor ratio rises over time and moves into region D-T, financial capital flows
change the direction from “downhill” to “uphill”. However, the country still receives net
capital inflows and accumulates capital at a faster speed than under IFA. However, as the
capital-labor ratio enters into region U-T, financial capital outflows exceed FDI inflows
and capital accumulation is slower than under IFA. Finally, it converges to a steady
state with a capital-labor ratio smaller than under IFA, KHFCM < KIFA. Starting from a
sufficiently low level of output, capital account liberalization offers a developing country
the short-run benefit of faster capital accumulation but at the long-run cost of a lower
level of output. Since KHFCM increases in θ
H , the developing country, when liberalizing
capital account, should promote financial development so as to avoid the long-run cost.
4 Conclusion
We develop a tractable, two-country, overlapping-generations model and show that cross-
country differences in financial development can explain three recent empirical character-
istics of international capital flows which have been puzzling. We also show that capital
account liberalization policies may offer a developing country the short-run benefit of
faster capital accumulation but at the long-run cost of a lower level of output. In order to
reduce the cost and exploit the benefit, the developing country should promote its level
of financial development when liberalizing capital account.
We take the level of financial development as given and analyze how differences in
financial development affect capital flows. An obvious and important question is how
economic growth and various forms of capital flows shape the institutional infrastructures,
e.g., the level of financial development. We leave this issue for future research.
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Appendix: not for publication
A Free Mobility of FDI
The equity rates are equalized across the border, ΓHt = Γ
F
t = Γ
∗
t . According to the credit
market equilibrium, domestic equity capital and investment in country i are
ηwit − Ωit =
(1− η)wit
λit − 1
and I it = λ
i
t(ηw
i
t − Ωit) =
λit(1− η)wit
λit − 1
⇒ θ
iRvit+1
rit
=
(1− η)wit
I it
.
Thus, the project-financing equation can be transformed into
1 =
θiRvit+1
rit
+
(1− θi)Rvit+1
Γ∗t
, ⇒ 1 = (1− η)w
i
t
I it
+
(1− θi)Rvit+1
Γ∗t
. (20)
Using Eq. (14) to substitute away vit+1 and I
i
t in Eq. (20), we get
(1− η)wit =
ρ
R
(wit+1)
1
α − (1− θ
i)ρwit+1
Γ∗t
. (21)
A.1 Existence, Uniqueness, and Stability of the Steady State
Let a variable with subscript FDI denote its steady-state value under free flows of FDI
Proposition 15. There exists a unique and stable non-zero steady state with the wage
rate at wiFDI = wIFA
[
1− η + η ΓiIFA
Γ∗FDI
]ρ
.
The solid line and the dash-dotted line in figure 4 show the phase diagrams of wages
under IFA and under free mobility of FDI, respectively, given a fixed world equity rate at
Γ∗t = Γ
i
IFA. In both cases, the wage converges monotonically and globally to the unique
and stable steady state (point A).
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Figure 4: The Phase Diagram of Wages
A.2 Interest Rates and Capital Flows
Proposition 16. There exists a unique world equity rate that clears the world equity
market every period. In the steady state, Γ∗FDI ∈ (Γ∗,ΓHIFA), where Γ∗ ≡ Γ
H
IFA+Γ
F
IFA
2
.
Given the steady-state equity rate in the two countries under IFA, ΓHIFA > Γ
F
IFA, the
steady-state equity rate under free mobility of FDI should lie between them.
Proposition 17. Under free mobility of FDI, if the borrowing constraints are binding in
country i, rit =
θiρ
(1−η)
wit+1
wit
. In the steady state, riFDI =
θiρ
1−η = r
i
IFA.
The proof resembles that of Proposition 4. In the steady-state, the equity-rate effect
and the price-of-capital effect cancel out so that the loan rate is same as under IFA.
Proposition 18. In the steady state, FDI flows from country F to country H, ΩHFCF <
0 < ΩFFCF , where Ω
i
FDI = (Γ
∗
FDI − ΓiIFA) ηw
i
FDI
Γ∗FDI
and i ∈ {H,F}.
In the steady state, FDI outflows from country i are proportional to the steady-state
equity-rate differentials under free mobility of FDI and under IFA. Since ΓHIFA > Γ
∗
FCF >
ΓFIFA, country H (F) has FDI inflows (outflows).
A.3 Production and Welfare
From period t = 0 on, FDI flows raise (reduce) aggregate investment in country H (F).
Thus, from period t = 1 on, aggregate output in country H (F) is higher (lower) than
before period t = 0, Y Ht > YIFA > Y
H
t .
Proposition 19. From period t = 1 on, Y Ht + Y
F
t < 2YIFA.
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The proof follows that of Proposition 6. As FDI flows widen the cross-country output
gap, the world output is lower than under IFA, due to the Jensen’s Inequality. The welfare
impacts are discussed briefly in subsection 3.2 and summarized in Proposition 20.
Proposition 20. In comparison with the steady state under IFA, free mobility of FDI
makes workers in country H (F) better (worse) off, while the welfare impacts on en-
trepreneurs and at the country level depend on the parameters.
Proposition 21. Entrepreneurs of different generations born in the same country may
be affected by FDI flows in opposite ways during the transitional process from IFA to free
mobility of FDI.
Entrepreneurs born in country H and period t = 0 are worse off, due to the decline
in the equity rate. According to Table 2, for (ρ−1)η
(1−η) ≥ 1, and the rise in labor income
dominates the decline in the equity rate in the long run and entrepreneurs born in country
H are better off in the long run. Entrepreneurs of early and later generations born in
country F may also be affected differently. Thus, free mobility of FDI may have opposite
welfare effects across generations.
B Threshold Values under Capital Mobility
B.1 Free Mobility of Financial Capital
Proposition 22. Given θH ∈ (0, θ¯), there exists θ¯FFCF ∈ (θ¯, 1 − θ
Hη
1−η ) as the function of
θH such that for θF ∈ (θH , θ¯FFCF ), the borrowing constraints are binding in both countries
in the steady state; for θF ∈ (θ¯FFCF , 1], the borrowing constraints are binding in country H
but not in country F and the economic allocation is same as that in the case of θF = θ¯FFCF .
Figure 5 illustrates these results. The horizontal and vertical axes denote θH ∈ (0, 1]
and θF ∈ (0, 1], respectively.
For θH = θF , i.e., the parameters on the 45 degree line, the loan rates are same in the
two countries under IFA. For θH ∈ [θ¯, 1] and θF ∈ [θ¯, 1], i.e., the parameters in region A,
the loan rates are equal to the marginal return on investment, which is same in the two
countries, according to Proposition 1. In these two cases, there are no financial capital
flows even if allowed. The curve splitting regions B and D represents the threshold value
θ¯FFCF as the function of θ
H described by Eq. (43). For the parameters on the curve,
the equity rate in country F is equal to the world loan rate, ΓFFCF =
(1−θ¯FFCF )ρ
η
= r∗FCF .
Similarly, the curve splitting region B′ and D′ represents the threshold value θ¯HFCF as the
function of θF . For the parameters on the curve, the equity rate in country H is equal to
the world loan rate, ΓHFCF =
(1−θ¯HFCF )ρ
η
= r∗FCF .
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Figure 5: Free Mobility of Financial Capital: Threshold Values
Table 3: Financial Capital Flows and Equity Premium in the Steady State
Region A B B′ D D′
ΥH 0 ΥH(θH) > 0 ΥH(θF ) < 0 (0,ΥH(θH)) (ΥH(θF ), 0)
ΓH − r∗ 0 + 0 + +
ΓF − r∗ 0 0 + + +
Table 3 summarizes the steady-state pattern of financial capital flows and the equity
premium in the five regions of figure 5. Note that ΥF = −ΥH . ΥH(θi) implies that given
the parameters in region B and B′, financial capital flows depend only on θi not on θm,
where i,m ∈ {H,F} and i 6= m. The borrowing constraints are strictly binding only if
the equity premium is positive.
B.2 Free Mobility of FDI
Proposition 23. If η ∈
[
2ρ
1+2(ρ+1)
, 1
)
, given θH ∈ (0, θ¯), there exists θ¯FFDI ∈ (θ¯, 1) as
the function of θH such that for θF ∈ (θH , θ¯FFDI), the borrowing constraints are binding in
country F in the steady state; for θF ∈ (θ¯FFDI , 1], the borrowing constraints are not binding
in country F and the economic allocation is same as that in the case of θF = θ¯FFDI .
If η ∈ (0, 2ρ
1+2ρ+1
), there exists θH such that given θH ∈ [θH , θ¯), there exists θ¯FFDI ∈
(θ¯, 1) as the function of θH such that for θF ∈ (θH , θ¯FFDI), the borrowing constraints are
binding in country F in the steady state; for θF ∈ (θ¯FFDI , 1], the borrowing constraints
are not binding in country F and the economic allocation is same as that in the case of
θF = θ¯FFDI . Given θ
H ∈ (0, θH), the borrowing constraints are always binding in country
F for θF ∈ (θH , 1].
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Figure 6 illustrates these results in the cases of η < 2
ρ
1+2ρ+1
and η > 2
ρ
1+2ρ+1
respectively.
The horizontal and vertical axes denote θH ∈ (0, 1] and θF ∈ (0, 1], respectively.
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Figure 6: Free Mobility of FDI: Threshold Values
For θH = θF , i.e., the parameters on the 45 degree line, the equity rate is same in
the two countries under IFA. For θH ∈ [θ¯, 1] and θF ∈ [θ¯, 1], i.e., the parameters in
region A, according to Proposition 1, the equity rates are equal to the marginal return
on investment, which is same in the two countries. In these two cases, there are no FDI
flows even if allowed. The curve splitting regions B and D represents the threshold value
of θ¯FFDI as the function of θ
H described by Eq. (44). For the parameters on the curve, the
loan rate in country F is equal to the world equity rate rFFDI =
θ¯FFDIρ
1−η = Γ
∗
FDI . Similarly,
the curve splitting regions B′ and D′ represents the threshold value of θ¯HFDI as the function
of θF . For the parameters on the curve, the loan rate in country H is equal to the world
equity rate, rHFDI =
θ¯HFDIρ
1−η = Γ
∗
FDI .
Table 4: FDI Flows and Equity Premium in the Steady State
Region A B B′ D D′
ΩH 0 ΩH(θH) < 0 ΩH(θF ) > 0 (ΩH(θH), 0) (0,ΩH(θF ))
ΓH − r∗ 0 + 0 + +
ΓF − r∗ 0 0 + + +
Table 4 summarizes the steady-state values of FDI flows and the equity premium in
the five regions. Note that ΩF = −ΩH . ΩH(θi) implies that given the parameters in
region B and B′, FDI flows depend only on θi not on θm, where i,m ∈ {H,F} and i 6= m.
The borrowing constraints are strictly binding only if the equity premium is positive.
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B.3 Full Capital Mobility
Proposition 24. Given θH ∈ (max{1 − 2η, 0}, 1 − η), there exists a threshold value
θ¯FFCM = 2(1 − η) − θH such that for θF ∈ (θH , θ¯FFCM), the borrowing constraints are
binding in both countries in the steady state; for θF ∈ (θ¯FFCM , 1], the world loan rate and
equity rate are same as the marginal return to investment, Γ∗ = r∗ = ρ, in the steady state,
the borrowing constraints are not binding in both countries, and the economic allocation
is same as that in the case of θF = θ¯FFCM .
Figure 7 illustrates the results. The horizontal and vertical axes denote θH ∈ (0, 1]
and θF ∈ (0, 1], respectively.
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Figure 7: Full Capital Mobility: Threshold Values
For θH = θF , i.e., the parameters on the 45 degree line, the loan rates are same in
the two countries under IFA and so are the equity rates. For θH ∈ [θ¯, 1] and θF ∈ [θ¯, 1],
i.e., the parameters in region A, according to Proposition 1, the loan rate and the equity
rate under IFA are equal to the marginal return on investment, which is same in the two
countries, riIFA = Γ
i
IFA = ρ. In these two cases, there are no financial capital flows or FDI
even if allowed. The line splitting region B and D represents the threshold value of θ¯FFCM
as the function of θH , while the line splitting region B′ and D′ represents the threshold
value of θ¯HFCM as the function of θ
F . For the parameters on the two lines, the world loan
rate is equal to the world equity rate, r∗ = Γ∗ = ρ.
Table 5 summarizes the steady-state pattern of capital flows and the equity premium
in the five regions of figure 7. Note that ΥF = −ΥH and ΩF = −ΩH . ΥH(θi) and ΩH(θi)
implies that given the parameters in region B and B′, financial capital flows and FDI
depend only on θi not on θm, where i,m ∈ {H,F} and i 6= m. The borrowing constraints
are strictly binding only if the equity premium is positive.
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Table 5: Capital Flows and Equity Premium in the Steady State
Region A B B′ D D′
ΥH 0 ΥH(θH) > 0 ΥH(θF ) < 0 (0,ΥH(θH)) (ΥH(θF ), 0)
ΩH 0 ΩH(θH) < 0 ΩH(θF ) > 0 (ΩH(θH), 0) (0,ΩH(θF ))
ΩH + ΥH 0 0 0 + −
Γ∗ − r∗ 0 0 0 + +
C Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Propositions 2
Proof. Take the world loan rate r∗t as given. According to Eq. (16), w
i
t+1 can be considered
as a function of wit. For w
i
t ∈ [0, (1−θ
i)ρ
Rη
(
R
r∗t
) 1
1−α
], take the first derivative of Eq. (16) with
respect to wit,
η =
[
ρ
Rα
(wit+1)
1
ρ − θ
iρ
r∗t
]
dwit+1
dwit
. (22)
According to Eq. (16), for wit = 0, there is a non-zero solution of w
i
t+1 =
[
θiR
r∗t
]ρ
. The slope
of the phase diagram at the point (0,
[
θiR
r∗t
]ρ
) is
r∗t η
θi
> 0. In other words, wit+1 ≥
(
θiR
r∗t
)ρ
.
Thus, according to Eq. (22), the phase diagram of wages has the positive slope,
dwit+1
dwit
> 0.
Take the second derivative of Eq. (16) with respect to wit,
0 =
[
ρ
Rα
(wit+1)
1
ρ − θ
iρ
r∗t
]
dwit+1
d2wit
+
(
dwit+1
dwit
)2
1
Rα
(wit+1)
1−2α
α , ⇒ dw
i
t+1
d2wit
< 0.
Thus, the phase diagram of wages is concave for wit ∈ [0, (1−θ
i)ρ
Rη
(
R
r∗t
) 1
1−α
], and wit+1 mono-
tonically increases in wit with an intercept on the vertical axis at w
i
t+1 =
[
θiR
r∗t
]ρ
.
For wit >
(1−θi)ρ
Rη
(
R
r∗t
) 1
1−α
, the marginal return on investment is equal to the world loan
rate, Rvit+1 = r
∗
t , and, thus, entrepreneurs do not borrow to the limit. The phase diagram
of wages wit+1 = (v
i
t+1)
− 1
ρ =
(
R
r∗t
)ρ
is flat and independent of wit.
The phase diagram of wages is continuous and concave. It crosses the 45 degree line
only once and from the left. There exists a stable and unique non-zero steady state.
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Take the world loan rate r∗t as given. For w
i
t ∈ (0, 1− θi] and iit = 1, take the first
and second derivatives of Eq. (17) with respect to wit,
dwit+1
dwit
=
ρr∗
θiR
(wit+1)
1
α > 0, and,
dwit+1
d2wit
=
ρr∗
θiR
1
α
(wit+1)
1
ρ
dwit+1
dwit
> 0. (23)
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The phase diagram of wages is convex for wit ∈ (0, 1 − θi]. By setting wit = 0 in Eq.
(17), we get the vertical intercept of the phase diagram of wages at wit+1 =
[
θiR
r∗t
]ρ
.
For wit > 1 − θi, the marginal return on investment is equal to the world loan rate,
Rvit+1 = r
∗
t , and, thus, entrepreneurs do not borrow to the limit. The phase diagram of
wages wit+1 = (v
i
t+1)
− 1
ρ =
(
R
r∗t
)ρ
is flat and independent of wit.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. The world loan rate is determined by the identity of financial capital flows, ΥHt +
ΥFt = 0. We first prove the existence of a unique world loan rate clearing the world credit
market every period and then derive the world loan rate in the steady state.
Suppose that the borrowing constraints are binding in country i. Given the predeter-
mined wit, Eq. (16) shows that w
i
t+1 is a function of r
∗
t . Take the first derivative of Eq.
(16) with respect to r∗t ,
0 =
[
ρ
Rα
(wit+1)
1
ρ − θ
iρ
r∗t
]
dwit+1
dr∗t
+
θiρ
(r∗t )2
.
As shown in the proof of Proposition 2, wit+1 ≥
(
θiR
r∗t
)ρ
so that the term in the square
bracket is positive. An increase in the world loan rate enhances financial capital outflows
and reduces domestic investment. Thus, the wage in the next period declines,
dwit+1
dr∗t
< 0.
Capital outflows represent the gap between domestic savings and investment,
Υit = w
i
t − I it = wit −
ρ
R
(wit+1)
1
α = (1− η)wit −
ρ
r∗t
θiwit+1. (24)
The world credit market equilibrium implies
ΥHt + Υ
F
t = 0, ⇒ (1− η)(wHt + wFt ) =
ρ
r∗t
(
θHwHt+1 + θ
FwFt+1
)
. (25)
The loan rate in country H is lower than in country F before period t = 0, rHIFA <
rFIFA. The world loan rate in period t ≥ 0 must be r∗t ∈ (rHIFA, rFIFA). The proof is by
contradiction. If r∗t > r
F
IFA > r
H
IFA, w
i
t+1 would be lower than under IFA in both countries,
as
dwit+1
dr∗t
< 0. Thus, Eq. (25) would not hold. The same argument applies to the case of
r∗t < r
H
IFA < r
F
IFA. Since w
i
t+1 monotonically decreases with r
∗
t , there is a unique solution
r∗t ∈ (rHIFA, rFIFA) that clears the world credit market and financial capital flows from
country H to F, given the predetermined wHt and w
F
t .
In the next step, we assume that there exists a unique world loan rate in the steady
state and then prove its uniqueness.
Given r∗, Proposition 2 shows that the wage in the steady state is wi =
(
R
ρ
)ρ (
η + θ
iρ
r∗
)ρ
.
According to Eq. (24), financial capital flows in the steady state are
Υi = wi
[
(1− η)− θ
iρ
r∗
]
⇒ Υi = (r∗ − riIFA)
(1− η)wi
r∗
(26)
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According to Eq. (25), the world loan rate in the steady state is determined by
ΥH + ΥF = 0, or,
θF ρ
1−η − r∗
r∗ − θHρ
1−η
=
wH
wF
, or,
rFIFA − r∗
r∗ − rHIFA
=
(
ηr∗ + θHρ
ηr∗ + θFρ
)ρ
. (27)
For 0 < θH < θF ≤ θ¯, the right-hand side of Eq. (27) is less than one,
rFIFA − r∗
r∗ − rHIFA
< 1, ⇒ r∗ ∈ (r∗, rFIFA).
Let ℵ(r∗) ≡ rFIFA−rHIFA
r∗−rHIFA
− 1 and <(r∗) ≡
[
1− (θF−θH)ρ
ηr∗+θF ρ
]ρ
denote the left-hand and the
right-hand sides of Eq. (27) as the functions of r∗. For r∗ ∈ (r∗, rFIFA),
ℵ′(r∗) < 0 < <′(r∗),
ℵ(r∗ = r∗) = 1 > <(r∗ = r∗),
ℵ(r∗ = rFIFA) = 0 < <(r∗ = rFIFA).
Thus, ℵ(r∗) decreases while <(r∗) increases monotonically in r∗; the two functions cross
once and only once at r∗ ∈ (r∗, rFIFA). Therefore, there exists a unique steady state.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Under free mobility of financial capital, if the borrowing constraints are binding
in country i, the equity rate is Γit =
(1−θ)Rvit+1
1− θRv
i
t+1
r∗t
. Using Eq. (14) and (15), we can rewrite
the equity rate as Γit =
(1−θi)Rvit+1 ηwit
ρ
R
(wit+1)
1
α
 =
(1−θi)ρ
η
wit+1
wit
.
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. See the proof of Proposition 3 and Eq. (26).
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. Let at ≡ w
H
t +w
F
t
2wIFA
and bt ≡ w
F
t −wHt
2wIFA
+
ΥHt
wIFA
, where t = 0, 1, 2, 3, .... According to
Proposition 5 and the aggregate resource constraint in country H, 0 < ΥHt < w
H
FCF , we
get bt ∈ (0, at). In period t ≥ 0, the aggregate project investment in country H and in
country F are IHt = w
H
t − ΥHt = (at − bt)wiIFA and IFt = wFt + ΥHt = (at + bt)wiIFA,
respectively. Given the share of capital goods in the aggregate production, α ∈ (0, 1), and
bt ∈ (0, at), the world-average wage in period t+ 1 can be reformulated into a condensed
form with the following property,
wHt+1 + w
H
t+1
2
=
(
R
ρ
)α [
(IHt )
α + (IFt )
α
2
]
⇔ at+1 = (at − bt)
α + (at + bt)
α
2
< (at)
α, (28)
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where the last inequality sign results from the Jensen’s Inequality. The wage in period
t = 0 is same in the two countries, wH0 = w
F
0 = wIFA, and, thus, a0 = 1. From period
0 on, financial capital flows are allowed. According to the inequality in Eq. (28), we get
a1 < 1. For t = 1, 2, 3, ..., given bt ∈ (0, at), we have at+1 < (at)α and, thus, the time
series of at is below 1, or equivalently,
wHt +w
F
t
2
< wIFA. Thus, the world output is smaller
than before period t = 0, Y Ht + Y
F
t =
wHt +w
F
t
1−α <
2wIFA
1−α = Y
H
IFA + Y
F
IFA.
Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. If the borrowing constraints are binding, the steady-state workers’ consumption is
ci,w = wir∗ =
(
R
ρ
)ρ (
r∗η + θiρ
)ρ
(r∗)1−ρ,
d ln ci,w
dr∗
=
r∗η + θiρ− θiρ2
(r∗η + θiρ)r∗
.
As an analytical solution of the world loan rate is not obtainable, we provide sufficient
conditions for the welfare changes as follows.
Let κ ≡ (ρ−1)(1−η)
η
. Evaluate d ln c
H,w
dr∗ at r
∗ = rHIFA and r
∗ = rFIFA. For κ ≤ 1,
d ln cH,w
dr∗ |r∗=rFIFA > d ln c
H,w
dr∗ |r∗=rHIFA ≥ 0 implies that workers born in country H is better off
in the long run than before period t = 0 since the positive loan rate effect dominates the
negative wage effect; for κ ≥ θF
θH
, d ln c
H,w
dr∗ |r∗=rHIFA < d ln c
H,w
dr∗ |r∗=rFIFA ≤ 0 implies that workers
born in country H is worse off in the long run since the negative wage effect dominates;
for κ ∈ (1, θF
θH
), the numerical solutions are needed for the welfare evaluation.
Evaluate d ln c
F,w
dr∗ at r
∗ = r∗ and r∗ = rFIFA. For κ ≤ θ
H+θF
2θF
, d ln c
F,w
dr∗ |r∗=rFIFA >
d ln cF,w
dr∗ |r∗=r∗ ≥ 0 implies that workers born in country F is worse off in the long run
than before period t = 0 since the negative loan rate effect dominates the positive wage
effect; for κ ≥ 1, d ln cF,w
dr∗ |r∗=rFIFA < d ln c
F,w
dr∗ |r∗=r∗ ≤ 0 implies that workers born in country
F is better off in the long run since the positive wage effect dominates; for κ ∈ ( θH+θF
2θF
, 1),
the numerical solutions are required for the welfare evaluation.
Social welfare in country i in the steady state is
Ci ≡ ηci,e + (1− η)ci,w = wi[ηΓi + (1− η)r∗]
=
(
R
ρ
)ρ (
r∗η + θiρ
)ρ
(r∗)−ρ[(1− θi)ρ+ (1− η)r∗],
d lnCi
dr∗
=
ηρ
r∗η + θiρ
− ρ
r∗
+
1− η
(1− θi)ρ+ (1− η)r∗ .
Evaluate d lnC
H
dr∗ at r
∗ = rHIFA and r
∗ = rFIFA. For ρ ∈ (0, θ
H
1−η ],
d lnCH
dr∗ |r∗=rFIFA > d lnC
H
dr∗ |r∗=rHIFA
≥ 0 implies that the workers’ welfare gains dominate the welfare losses of entrepreneurs
and hence, country H as a whole benefits from free mobility of financial capital; for
ρ ∈ [ θF [θH+η(θF−θH)]
(1−η)θH [1+(θF−θH)] ,∞), d lnC
H
dr∗ |r∗=rHIFA < d lnC
H
dr∗ |r∗=rFIFA ≤ 0 implies that both workers
31
and entrepreneurs are worse off or the workers’ welfare gains are dominated by the wel-
fare losses of entrepreneurs and hence, country H as a whole loses from free mobility of
financial capital; for ρ ∈ ( θH
1−η ,
θF [θH+η(θF−θH)]
(1−η)θH [1+(θF−θH)]), the numerical solutions are required for
the welfare evaluation.
Evaluate d lnC
F
dr∗ at r
∗ = r∗ and r∗ = rFIFA. For ρ ∈ (0,
θH+θF
2(1−η)
[
θF− η(θF−θH )
2
]
θF
[
1− (θF−θH )
2
] ], d lnCF
dr∗ |r∗=rFIFA
≥ d lnCF
dr∗ |r∗=r∗ ≥ 0 implies that both workers and entrepreneurs are worse off or the
workers’ welfare gains are dominated by the welfare losses of entrepreneurs and hence,
country F as a whole loses from free mobility of financial capital; for ρ ∈ [ θF
1−η ,∞),
d lnCF
dr∗ |r∗=r∗ < d lnC
F
dr∗ |r∗=rFIFA ≤ 0 implies that the workers’ welfare gains dominate the wel-
fare losses of entrepreneurs and hence, country H as a whole benefits from free mobility
of financial capital; for ρ ∈ (
θH+θF
2(1−η)
[
θF− η(θF−θH )
2
]
θF
[
1− (θF−θH )
2
] , θF
1−η ), the numerical solutions are required
for the welfare evaluation.
Proof of Proposition 9
Proof. According to Eq. (19), wit+1 is determined only by Γ
∗
t and r
∗
t . The phase diagram
of wages is flat and crosses the 45 degree line only once and from the left.
Proof of Proposition 10
Proof. The world equity rate Γ∗t is determined by the identity of FDI flows, Ω
H
t + Ω
F
t = 0
and the world loan rate r∗t by Υ
H
t +Υ
F
t = 0. We first prove the existence of a unique world
equity (loan) rate and clearing the world equity (credit) market every period. Then, we
derive the world interest rates in the steady state.
According to the domestic credit market equilibrium and the Cobb-Douglas production
function, FDI and financial capital flows are solved as
λit
(
ηwit − Ωit
)
=
λit
λit − 1
[
(1− η)wit −Υit
]
= I it =
ρ
R
(wit+1)
1
α , (29)
Ωit = ηw
i
t −
(1− θi)ρ
Γ∗t
wit+1, (30)
Υit = (1− η)wit −
θiρ
r∗t
wit+1, (31)
Ωit + Υ
i
t = w
i
t − I it = wit −
ρ
R
(wit+1)
1
α . (32)
Given the world interest rates at Γ∗t and r
∗
t and the predetermined labor income w
i
t, w
i
t+1 is
uniquely determined under full capital mobility and so are Υit and Ω
i
t. Take first derivative
32
of Eq. (30) and (31) with respect to the two interest rates, respectively,
dΩit
dΓ∗t
=
(1− θi)ρ
(Γ∗t )2
wit+1 −
(1− θi)ρ
Γ∗t
dwit+1
dΓ∗t
> 0,
dΩit
dr∗t
= −(1− θ
i)ρ
Γ∗t
dwit+1
dr∗t
> 0,
dΥit
dr∗t
=
θiρ
(r∗t )2
wit+1 −
θiρ
r∗t
dwit+1
dr∗t
> 0,
dΥit
dΓ∗t
=
θiρ
r∗t
dwit+1
dΓ∗t
> 0.
Υit and Ω
i
t increase monotonically in Γ
∗
t and r
∗
t . By contradiction, we can prove the
existence and the uniqueness of the world interest rates as Γ∗t ∈ (ΓFIFA,ΓHIFA) and r∗t ∈
(rHIFA, r
F
IFA). Given w
i
t, the world interest rates Γ
∗
t and r
∗
t are uniquely determined by the
two equilibrium conditions, i.e., ΩHt + Ω
F
t = 0 and Υ
H
t + Υ
F
t = 0,
η(wHt + w
F
t ) =
ρ
Γ∗t
[
(1− θH)Rρ
(
1− θH
Γ∗t
+
θH
r∗t
)ρ
+ (1− θF )Rρ
(
1− θF
Γ∗t
+
θF
r∗t
)ρ]
,
(1− η)(wHt + wFt ) =
ρ
r∗t
[
θHRρ
(
1− θH
Γ∗t
+
θH
r∗t
)ρ
+ θFRρ
(
1− θF
Γ∗t
+
θF
r∗t
)ρ]
.
In the next step, we assume that there exists a unique world loan rate and a unique world
equity rate in the steady state and then prove that they are indeed unique.
In the steady state, wit+1 = w
i
t. According to Eq. (30) and (31), the equilibrium
conditions of FDI and financial capital flows, ΩH + ΩF = ΥH + ΥF = 0, are rewritten as,
η − (1−θF )ρ
Γ∗
(1−θH)ρ
Γ∗ − η
=
wH
wF
=
θF ρ
r∗ − (1− η)
(1− η)− θHρ
r∗
, (33)
(θF − θH)ρ
(ρ− ηΓ∗)− θHρ − 1 =
(θF − θH)ρ
(1− η)r∗ − θHρ − 1, (34)
(ρ− ηΓ∗)− θHρ = (1− η)r∗ − θHρ, ⇒ Γ∗ = ρ
η
− 1− η
η
r∗. (35)
In the case of the binding borrowing constraints, ∂ lnw
i
∂θi
= ρ(Γ
∗−r∗)
r∗+θi(Γ∗−r∗) > 0 implies w
H <
wF . According to Eq. (33),
η − (1−θF )ρ
Γ∗
(1−θH)ρ
Γ∗ − η
=
θF ρ
r∗ − (1− η)
(1− η)− θHρ
r∗
=
wH
wF
< 1, ⇒ Γ∗ < Γ∗ and r∗ > r∗.
Thus, the steady-state values of the world equity rate and the world loan rate are Γ∗ ∈
(ΓFIFA,Γ
∗) and r∗ ∈ (r∗, rFIFA), respectively.
Substitute Eq. (35) and wi = Rρ
[
1−θi
Γ∗t
+ θ
i
r∗t
]ρ
into Eq. (33), r∗ solves,
(θF − θH)
(1− η) r∗
ρ
− θH − 1 =
[
1− (θ
F − θH)
η
ρ
r∗−1
+ θF
]ρ
. (36)
Let ℵ(r∗) ≡ (θF−θH)
(1−η) r∗
ρ
−θH −1 and <(r∗) ≡
[
1− (θF−θH)η
ρ
r∗ −1
+θF
]ρ
denote the functions of r∗ defined
by the left-hand and the right-hand sides of Eq. (36). Given θF > θH and r∗ ∈ (r∗, rFIFA),
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we get
ℵ′(r∗) < 0 < <′(r∗),
ℵ(r∗ = r∗) = 1 > <(r∗ = r∗),
ℵ(r∗ = rFIFA) = 0 < <(r∗ = rFIFA).
In the steady state, there exists a unique world loan rate r∗ ∈ (r∗, rFIFA) that solves Eq.
(36). So does the world equity rate, according to Eq. (35).
Proof of Proposition 11
Proof. See the proofs of Propositions 10 and 12.
Proof of Proposition 12
Proof. According to Eq. (30) and (31), the steady-state values of FDI and financial
capital flows are Ωi = (Γ∗ − ΓiIFA) ηw
i
Γ∗ and Υ
i = (r∗ − riIFA) (1−η)w
i
r∗ , respectively. Since
r∗ ∈ (r∗, rFIFA), financial capital flows from country H to country F, ΥH > 0 > ΥF ; since
Γ∗ ∈ (ΓFIFA,Γ∗), FDI flows in the opposite direction, ΩH < 0 < ΩF . The direction of
capital flows is same as under free mobility of FDI and financial capital, respectively.
According to Eq. (32), net capital flows are Ωi + Υi = wi
[
1− ρ
R
(wi)
1
ρ
]
in the steady
state. The identity of net capital flows ΩH + ΥH + ΩF + ΥF = 0 implies∑
i∈{H,F}
wi
[
1− ρ
R
(wi)
1
ρ
]
= 0 ⇒
[
1− ρ
R
(wH)
1
ρ
] [
1− ρ
R
(wF )
1
ρ
]
≤ 0. (37)
If Γ∗ > r∗, the borrowing constraints are binding and the steady-state wage is lower in
country H than in country F, wH ≤ wF . Thus, 1 − ρ
R
(wH)
1
ρ > 1 − ρ
R
(wF )
1
ρ . According
to Eq. (37), 1− ρ
R
(wH)
1
ρ > 0 > 1− ρ
R
(wF )
1
ρ and net capital flows are from country H to
country F in the steady state, ΩH + ΥH > 0 > ΩF + ΥF .
If Γ∗ = r∗, the borrowing constraints are not binding and the steady-state wage is
same in the two countries with zero net capital flows, wi =
(
R
ρ
)ρ
and Ωi + Υi = 0.
Economic allocation is almost same as under IFA except that the interest rates in country
H are different, Γ∗ = ρ < ΓHIFA and r
∗ = ρ > rHIFA.
Proof of Proposition 13
Proof. According to Eq. (30) and (31), in the steady state, r∗Υi + Γ∗Ωi = wi[(1 −
η)r∗ + ηΓ∗] − ρwi. According to Eq. (35), we get r∗Υi + Γ∗Ωi = 0. This way, as a
net debtor, ΥF + ΩF < 0, country F receives a positive net investment income, NIIF ≡
(r∗−1)ΥF +(Γ∗−1)ΩF = 0−(ΥF +ΩF ) > 0. Intuitively, the net interest income received
by entrepreneurs from investing abroad, |(Γ∗ − 1)ΩF | dominates the net interest income
paid to foreign workers, |(r∗ − 1)ΥF |, due to the positive equity premium.
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Proof of Proposition 14
Proof. According to Proposition 12, wHFCM ≤ wiIFA ≤ wFFCM . Given the world equity
rate Γ∗FCM ∈ (ΓFIFA,Γ∗), entrepreneurs born in country H (F) are worse (better) off in the
long run than before period t = 0, due to the declines (increases) in the wage and in the
equity rate, ci,e = wiΓi.
In the steady state, social welfare in country i is Ci = ηci,e+(1−η)ci,w = wi[ηΓ∗+(1−
η)r∗]. According to Eq. (35), social welfare is proportional to aggregate labor income,
Ci = wiρ. Due to net capital flows, aggregate investment in country H (F) is lower and
so are the aggregate labor income and social welfare.
Proof of Proposition 15
Proof. Take the world equity rate Γ∗t as given. According to Eq. (21), w
i
t+1 is considered
as a function of wit. For w
i
t ∈ [0, θ
iρ
R(1−η)
(
R
Γ∗t
) 1
1−α
), the marginal return on investment is
equal to the world equity rate, Rvit+1 = Γ
∗
t , and, thus, entrepreneurs do not borrow to the
limit. The phase diagram of wages is flat at wit+1 =
(
R
Γ∗t
)ρ
, independent of wit.
For wit ≥ θ
iρ
R(1−η)
(
R
Γ∗t
) 1
1−α
, take the first derivative of Eq. (21) with respect to wit,
1− η =
[
ρ
Rα
(wit+1)
1
ρ − (1− θ
i)ρ
Γ∗t
]
dwit+1
dwit
. (38)
For wit =
θiρ
R(1−η)
(
R
Γ∗t
) 1
1−α
, there is a non-zero solution wit+1 =
(
R
Γ∗t
)ρ
. The slope of the
phase diagram at the point ( θ
iρ
R(1−η)
(
R
Γ∗t
) 1
1−α
,
(
R
Γ∗t
)ρ
) is
Γ∗t η
ρ[ 1
α
−(1−θi)] > 0. In other words,
wit+1 ≥
(
θiR
r∗t
)ρ
. Thus, according to Eq. (38), the phase diagram has the positive slope,
dwit+1
dwit
> 0. Take the second derivative of Eq. (21) with respect to wit,
0 =
[
ρ
Rα
(wit+1)
1
ρ − (1− θ
i)ρ
Γ∗t
]
dwit+1
d2wit
+
(
dwit+1
dwit
)2
1
Rα
(wit+1)
1−2α
α , ⇒ dw
i
t+1
d2wit
< 0.
The phase diagram of wages is concave for wit >
θiρ
R(1−η)
(
R
Γ∗t
) 1
1−α
and wit+1 monotonically
increases in wit.
The phase diagram of wages is continuous and concave. It crosses the 45 degree line
only once and from the left. There exists a stable and unique non-zero steady state.
Proof of Proposition 16
Proof. The world equity rate is determined by the identity of FDI flows, ΩHt + Ω
F
t = 0.
We first prove the existence of a unique world equity rate clearing the world equity market
every period and then derive the world equity rate in the steady state.
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Suppose that the borrowing constraints are binding in country i. Given the predeter-
mined wit, Eq. (21) shows that w
i
t+1 is a function of Γ
∗
t . Take the first derivative of Eq.
(21) with respect to Γ∗t ,
0 =
[
ρ
Rα
(wit+1)
1
ρ − (1− θ
i)ρ
Γ∗t
]
dwit+1
dr∗t
+
(1− θi)ρ
(Γ∗t )2
.
As shown in the proof of Proposition 15, wit+1 ≥
(
R
Γ∗t
)ρ
so that the term in square brackets
is positive. An increase in the world equity rate enhances FDI outflows and reduces the
domestic investment. Thus, the wage in the next period declines,
dwit+1
dΓ∗t
< 0.
Capital outflows represent the gap between domestic savings and investment,
Ωit = w
i
t − I it = wit −
ρ
R
(wit+1)
1
α = ηwit −
ρ
Γ∗t
(1− θi)wit+1. (39)
The world equity market equilibrium implies
ΩHt + Ω
F
t = 0, ⇒ η(wHt + wFt ) =
ρ
Γ∗t
[
(1− θH)wHt+1 + (1− θF )wFt+1
]
. (40)
The equity rate in country H is higher than in country F before period t = 0, ΓHIFA >
ΓFIFA. Given the predetermined wage w
H
t and w
F
t , the world equity rate in period t
must be Γ∗t ∈ (ΓFIFA,ΓHIFA) and FDI flows from country F to country H. The proof is by
contradiction similar as in the proof of Proposition 3.
In the next step, we assume that there exists a unique world equity rate in the steady
state and then prove its uniqueness.
Given Γ∗, Proposition 15 shows the steady-state wage wi =
(
R
ρ
)ρ [
(1− η) + (1−θi)ρ
Γ∗
]ρ
.
According to Eq. (39), FDI flows in the steady state are
Ωi = wi
[
η − (1− θ
i)ρ
Γ∗
]
⇒ Ωi = (Γ∗ − ΓiIFA)
ηwi
Γ∗
. (41)
According to Eq. (40), the world equity rate in the steady state is determined by
ΩH + ΩF = 0, ⇒ Γ
∗ − (1−θF )ρ
η
(1−θH)ρ
η
− Γ∗
=
wH
wF
, ⇒ Γ
∗ − ΓFIFA
ΓHIFA − Γ∗
=
[
Γ∗ + 1−θ
H
1−η ρ
Γ∗ + 1−θ
F
1−η ρ
]ρ
. (42)
For θH ∈ (0, θ¯) and θF > θH , the right-hand side of Eq. (42) is larger than one,
Γ∗ − ΓFIFA
ΓHIFA − Γ∗
> 1, or Γ∗ ∈ (Γ∗,ΓHIFA).
Let ℵ(Γ∗) ≡ ΓHIFA−ΓFIFA
ΓHIFA−Γ∗
− 1 and <(Γ∗) ≡
[
1 + (θ
F−θH)ρ
(1−η)Γ∗+(1−θF )ρ
]ρ
denote the left-hand
and the right-hand sides of Eq. (42) as the functions of Γ∗. For Γ∗ ∈ (Γ∗,ΓHIFA),
ℵ′(Γ∗) > 0 > <′(Γ∗),
ℵ(Γ∗ = Γ∗) = 0 < <(Γ∗ = Γ∗),
ℵ(Γ∗ = ΓHIFA)→∞ > <(Γ∗ = ΓHIFA).
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ℵ(Γ∗) decreases while <(Γ∗) increases monotonically in Γ∗; the two functions cross once
and only once at Γ∗ ∈ (Γ∗,ΓHIFA). Thus, there exists a unique non-zero steady state.
Proof of Proposition 18
Proof. See the proof of Proposition 16 and Eq. (41).
Proof of Proposition 20
Proof. If the borrowing constraints are binding, the steady-state consumption of en-
trepreneurs is
ci,e = wiΓ∗ =
(
R
ρ
)ρ [
Γ∗(1− η) + (1− θi)ρ]ρ (Γ∗)1−ρ,
d ln ci,e
dΓ∗
=
Γ∗(1− η) + (1− θi)ρ(1− ρ)
[Γ∗(1− η) + (1− θi)ρ]Γ∗ .
As the analytical solution of the world equity rate is not obtainable, we provide the
sufficient conditions of welfare changes as follows.
Let µ ≡ (ρ−1)η
(1−η) . Evaluate
d ln cH,e
dΓ∗ at Γ
∗ = ΓHIFA and Γ
∗ = Γ∗. For µ ≤ (1−θH)+(1−θF )
2(1−θH) ,
d ln cH,e
dΓ∗ |Γ∗=ΓHIFA > d ln c
H,e
dΓ∗ |Γ∗=Γ∗ ≥ 0 implies that entrepreneurs born in country H is worse
off in the long run than under before period t = 0, since the negative equity rate effect
dominates the positive wage effect; for µ > 1, d ln c
H,e
dΓ∗ |Γ∗=Γ∗ < d ln c
H,e
dΓ∗ |Γ∗=ΓHIFA ≤ 0 implies
that entrepreneurs born in country H is better off in the long run since the positive wage
effect dominates; for µ ∈ ( (1−θH)+(1−θF )
2(1−θH) , 1), the numerical solutions are required for the
welfare evaluation.
Evaluate d ln c
F,e
dΓ∗ at Γ
∗ = ΓHIFA and Γ
∗ = ΓFIFA. For µ ≤ 1, we get d ln c
F,e
dΓ∗ |Γ∗=ΓHIFA >
d ln cF,e
dΓ∗ |Γ∗=ΓFIFA ≥ 0, implying that entrepreneurs born in country F is better off in the
long run since the positive equity rate effect dominates the negative wage effect; for
µ ≥ 1−θH
1−θF , we get
d ln cF,e
dΓ∗ |Γ∗=ΓFIFA < d ln c
F,e
dΓ∗ |Γ∗=ΓHIFA ≤ 0, implying that entrepreneurs born
in country F is worse off in the long run since the the negative wage effect dominates; for
µ ∈ (1, 1−θH
1−θF , 1), the numerical solutions are required for the welfare evaluation.
Social welfare of country i in the steady state is
Ci ≡ ηci,e + (1− η)ci,w = wi[ηΓ∗ + (1− η)ri]
=
(
R
ρ
)ρ [
Γ∗(1− η) + (1− θi)ρ]ρ (Γ∗)−ρ(ηΓ∗ + θiρ),
d lnCi
dΓ∗
=
(1− η)ρ
Γ∗(1− η) + (1− θi)ρ −
ρ
Γ∗
+
η
ηΓ∗ + θiρ
.
Evaluate d lnC
H
dΓ∗ at Γ
∗ = ΓHIFA and Γ
∗ = Γ∗. For ρ ∈ (0, (2−θH−θF )[2−θH−θF+η(θF−θH)]
2(1−θH)[(2−(θF−θH)] ],
d lnCH
dΓ∗ |Γ∗=ΓHIFA > d lnC
H
dΓ∗ |Γ∗=Γ∗ ≥ 0 implies that the welfare loss of entrepreneurs dominates
the welfare gains of workers and hence, country H as a whole loses in the long run from
37
free mobility of FDI; for ρ ∈ [1−θH
η
,∞), d lnCH
dΓ∗ |Γ∗=Γ∗ < d lnC
H
dΓ∗ |Γ∗=ΓHIFA ≤ 0 implies that
both workers and entrepreneurs are better off or the workers’ welfare gains dominate
the welfare losses of entrepreneurs and hence, country H as a whole benefits in the long
run from free mobility of FDI; for ρ ∈ ( (2−θH−θF )[2−θH−θF+η(θF−θH)]
2(1−θH)[(2−(θF−θH)] ,
1−θH
η
), the numerical
solutions are required for the welfare evaluation.
Evaluate d lnC
F
dΓ∗ at Γ
∗ = ΓHIFA and Γ
∗ = ΓFIFA. For ρ ∈ (0, 1−θ
H
η
], d lnC
F
dΓ∗ |Γ∗=ΓHIFA >
d lnCF
dΓ∗ |Γ∗=ΓFIFA ≥ 0 implies that the welfare gains of entrepreneurs dominates the welfare
losses of workers and hence, country F as a whole benefits in the long run from free mobility
of FDI; for ρ ∈ [ (1−θH)[1−θH−η(θF−θH)]
η(1−θF )(1+θF−θH) ,∞), d lnC
F
dΓ∗ |Γ∗=ΓFIFA < d lnC
F
dΓ∗ |Γ∗=ΓHIFA ≤ 0 implies
that both workers and entrepreneurs are worse off or the welfare gains of entrepreneurs is
dominated by the welfare losses of workers and hence, country F as a whole loses in the
long run from free mobility of FDI; for ρ ∈ (1−θF
η
, (1−θ
H)[1−θH−η(θF−θH)]
η(1−θF )(1+θF−θH) ), the numerical
solutions are required for the welfare evaluation.
Proof of Proposition 22
Proof. According to Proposition 4, if the borrowing constraints are binding in the two
countries under free mobility of financial capital, the steady-state equity rate Γi = (1−θ
i)ρ
η
has the same form as under IFA. Given θH ∈ (0, θ¯) and θF = θ¯FFCF , the equity rate
in country F is equal to the world loan rate and the borrowing constraints are weakly
binding in the steady state, ΓF =
ρ(1−θ¯FFCF )
η
= r∗. Thus, θ¯FFCF is the solution to the
following equation,
θ¯FFCF − 1−ηη (1− θ¯FFCF )
1−η
η
(1− θ¯FFCF )− θH
= (1− θ¯FFCF + θH)ρ. (43)
Let ℵ(θ¯FFCF ) ≡ θ¯
F
FCF−θH
1−η
η
(1−θ¯FFCF )−θH
− 1 and <(θ¯FFCF ) ≡ (1− θ¯FFCF + θH)ρ denote the left-hand
and the right-hand sides of Eq. (43) as the functions of θ¯FFCF . For θ¯
F
FCF ∈ (θ¯, 1− θ
Hη
1−η ),
ℵ′(θ¯FFCF ) > 0 > <′(θ¯FFCF ),
ℵ(θ¯FFCF = θ¯) = 0 < (η + θH)ρ = <(θ¯FFCF = θ¯),
ℵ(θ¯FFCF = 1−
θHη
1− η )→ +∞ >
(
θH
1− η
)ρ
= <(θ¯FFCF = 1−
θHη
1− η ).
Thus, ℵ(θ¯FFCF ) monotonically increases while <(θ¯FFCF ) monotonically decreases in θ¯FFCF ;
the two functions cross once and only once for θ¯FFCF ∈ (θ¯, 1 − θ
Hη
1−η ). Therefore, the
threshold value of θ¯FFCF ∈ (θ¯, 1− θ
Hη
1−η ) exists and is unique.
For θF ∈ (θ¯FFCF , 1], ΓF = r∗ in the steady state and the borrowing constraints are not
binding in country F. The economic allocation is same as in the case of θF = θ¯FFCF .
Proof of Proposition 23
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Proof. If the borrowing constraints are binding in the two countries under free mobility
of FDI, the steady-state loan rate ri = θ
iρ
(1−η) has the same form as under IFA. Suppose
that given θH ∈ (0, θ¯) and θF = θ¯FFDI , the borrowing constraints are binding and the loan
rate in country F is equal to the world equity rate, rF = θ
F ρ
1−η = Γ
∗. Substitute it into Eq.
(42),
η − (1− θ¯FFDI)
(1− η)(1− θH)− θFη = (1 + θ¯
F
FDI − θH)ρ. (44)
It can be shown for η ∈ [ 2ρ
1+2ρ+1
, 1), given θH ∈ (0, θ¯), there exist a θ¯FFDI ∈ (θ¯, 1) that solve
Eq. (44). For η ∈ (0, 2ρ
1+2ρ+1
), there exists a θH that solves Eq. (45),
η
(1− η)(1− θH)− η = (2− θ
H)ρ. (45)
For θH ∈ [θH , θ¯), there exists θ¯FFDI that solves Eq. (44); for θH ∈ (0, θH), the borrowing
constraints are always binding in country F for θF ∈ (θH , 1].
Proof of Proposition 24
Proof. Suppose that for θH ∈ (max{1 − 2η, 0}, 1 − η) and θF = θ¯FFCM , the borrowing
constraints are binding and the loan rate is equal to the equity rate in both countries.
According to Eq. (35), Γ∗ = r∗ = ρ. The wage is same in the two countries, wi =
(
R
η
)ρ
.
According to Eq. (33),
θF ρ
r∗ − (1− η)
(1− η)− θHρ
r∗
=
wH
wF
= 1, ⇒ θ¯FFCM = 2(1− η)− θH . (46)
For θF ∈ (θ¯FFCM , 1), the borrowing constraints are not binding and the loan rate is equal
to the equity rate at Γ∗ = r∗ = ρ.
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